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Abstract
We augment a Schumpeterian growth model with a public basic-research sector
to examine how much a country should invest in basic research. We ﬁnd that the
closer the country is to the world’s technological frontier the more the govern-
ment should invest in basic research. Basic-research expenditures are increasing
with a country’s degree of openness as long as innovation sizes are small. We pro-
vide possible explanations for the empirical evidence available on basic-research
expenditures across countries.
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It is widely recognized in economic literature that basic research1 plays a signiﬁcant role
in economic growth (e.g. Narin et al. 1997, Mansﬁeld 1998, Martin 1998)2. However,
large inequalities are observable across countries with respect to basic-research expen-
ditures (e.g., Cole and Phelan 1999 and Schofer 2004). The majority of basic research
is performed by a small number of highly industrialized countries. For example, the US
and Japan together account for almost half of the global basic-research expenditures.
By contrast, technologically backward countries such as China and Argentina invest
very little in basic research (OECD 2006).
Basic research is usually provided publicly by the government (see OECD 2004). In
this paper we build on Aghion et al. (2006) and incorporate publicly ﬁnanced basic
research into a Schumpeterian growth framework. We ask how much a country should
invest in basic research depending on its degree of openness and its distance from the
world’s technological frontier.
We assume that basic research increases the innovation probability of private interme-
diate ﬁrms within a country.3 Intermediate sectors diﬀer with regard to the distance
from the world’s technological frontier. The country’s degree of openness is reﬂected
by the probability of market entry by a foreign ﬁrm. The country is exposed to the
technological frontier, i.e. foreign ﬁrms always enter at the world’s most advanced tech-
nological level and consequently drive domestic ﬁrms operating at a lower technological
level out of the market. Only those domestic ﬁrms that are close to the technological
frontier and have been successful with innovation are internationally competitive and
can hence prevent a potential foreign entrant from encroaching on the domestic market.
We allow the government to allocate a share of labor to basic research. The workers
in this sector have to be paid competitive wages. The government’s decision on basic
research is then characterized by the following considerations: First, by increasing
1A standard deﬁnition of basic research is given by the OECD: “Basic research is experimental
or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of
phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view” (OECD, 2002, p.
30).
2See Salter and Martin (2001) for an extensive review of this literature.
3Several empirical studies (e.g. Jaﬀe 1989, Katz 1994, Narin et al. 1997, Zellner 2003; see Salter
and Martin (2001) for a detailed review of this literature.) support our assumption by indicating that
basic research has a strong tendency to produce local eﬀects. They suggest, for instance, that basic
research increases the innovation chances of domestic ﬁrms by the education of problem-solvers and
local informal face-to-face interactions.
1the innovation probability, basic research helps to escape entry of foreign ﬁrms to
technologically advanced sectors. Second, basic research helps to sustain the monopoly
of backward ﬁrms, as the competitive fringe catches up with such a ﬁrm when it is not
innovating. Third, basic research is a costly way of fostering technological progress in
comparison with the free import of foreign high technology.
We solve the government’s problem for polar cases - technologically advanced and
backward countries - and we derive additional results by numerical simulations for
intermediate cases. For large sets of parameter values, we ﬁnd that the higher the share
of high-technology sectors is the more a government should invest in basic research.
The eﬀect of openness on the optimal amount of basic research is ambiguous. With a
small innovation size, the free productivity boost linked to the entry of foreign high-
technology ﬁrms is small. Accordingly, the government will prefer to prevent foreign
entry and keep the domestic intermediates’ proﬁts in the country. For this reason,
optimal basic research increases with the country’s openness. However, with a high
innovation size, the opposite investment behavior is optimal. The entry of foreign ﬁrms
is welcome as they import leading technology and eﬀect large productivity increases
in the domestic country. In other words, to achieve a higher level of technology, it is
cheaper to allow the entry of foreign ﬁrms and to forgo intermediate proﬁts than to
draw labor from production for basic research.
As we will elaborate in detail in section 6.1, our theoretical results may provide pos-
sible explanations for two empirical patterns. First, basic-research expenditures and
technology levels are positively correlated. Second, there is an ambiguous relationship
between basic research and the degree of openness.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we relate our work to the
literature on economic growth. The model is presented in section 3. Section 4 contains
a discussion of the eﬀects of basic research in our model, followed by a comparative
statics analysis in section 5. In section 6, we discuss our results and relate them to the
empirical pattern of basic research. Our conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 Relation to the Literature on Economic Growth
Theoretical literature on economic growth has mostly focused on private R&D ac-
tivities. In the standard innovation-driven growth models (Romer 1990, Aghion and
2Howitt 1992) proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms engage in R&D activities to generate (partially)
excludable knowledge or ”blueprints” for new marketable intermediate goods.
There are a few attempts in literature to include basic research in an R&D-driven
growth model. Contributions to the discussion mostly focus on the optimal basic-
research investment for economic growth in closed countries. Shell (1967) presented
the ﬁrst model of this kind. However, his model does not consider applied research
by private ﬁrms. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms conducting diﬀerent kinds of research are
the focus chosen by Osano (1992), who investigates how the composition of basic and
applied research aﬀects growth. He does not include a public basic-research sector.
In Bail´ en (1994) the same issue is examined, this time with publicly ﬁnanced basic
research. Morales (2004) combines the approaches of Osano and Bail´ en in a model
where both the ﬁrms and the government perform basic research. She analyzes what
kind of research policy pertaining to public provision and subsidies for basic/applied
research leads to optimal growth. In another article, Pelloni (1997) examines the
government’s task to generate the conditions for growth by ﬁnancing higher education
and/or scientiﬁc research, whereas both are perfect substitutes.
The papers closest to ours are those by Park (1998) and Carillo and Papagni (2007).
The former analyzes cross-country spillovers of basic research in a growth model with
two identical countries and determines the eﬃcient size of a country’s basic research
sector in relation to the economy’s openness. Here basic research is considered as a
global public good, whereas we focus on basic research as an instrument in enhancing
the innovation prospects of domestic ﬁrms. Additionally, we allow for diﬀerent levels
of technology across countries. The paper by Carillo and Papagni (2007) delivers an
explanation for the high cross-country inequalities observed in basic research invest-
ments by examining the scientiﬁc reward system in relation to the size of the scientiﬁc
sector. We focus on how openness and the state of technology impact on the size of
the basic-research sector.
3 The Model
Building on the Schumpeterian growth model proposed by Aghion et al. (2006), we
introduce a basic-research sector operated by the government. We assume that there
is a continuum of identical households that live for one period, enjoy strictly increasing
utility in consumption, inelastically supply one unit of labor, and receive an equal share
3of the ﬁnal good and intermediate ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We consider a government maximizing
domestic consumption over a single period by publicly providing basic research ﬁnanced
by an income tax.4 Accordingly, we ﬁrst describe the production side of the economy
and derive the equilibrium for a given level of basic research. We then proceed to solve
the government’s optimization problem.
3.1 Final-Good Sector
In the ﬁnal-good sector, a continuum of competitive ﬁrms produces the homogeneous







x(i) stands for the amount of intermediate input of variety i and A(i) is this variety’s
productivity factor. The parameter α determines the output elasticity of the inter-
mediate goods or the level of technology. The price of the ﬁnal consumption good
is normalized to one. In the following we will operate with one representative ﬁnal-
good ﬁrm. Maximization of the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm’s proﬁts πy gives the inverse demand
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where p(i) is the price of good x(i).
3.2 Intermediate-Goods Sectors
The intermediate goods x(i) are produced by labor Lx(i) only, using a linear technology:
x(i) = L
x(i). (3)
Intermediate-goods ﬁrms act competitively in the labor market and compete ` a la
Bertrand in their intermediate sector. The productivity leader is able to establish a
monopoly position and perfect competition prevails if there is no technological leader.
4The model can be seen as a non-overlapping generations model in which each generation elects
a government to provide public goods (here basic research) in order to maximize its well-being. The
latter is equivalent to maximizing the consumption of the current generation. This, however, does
not square with a social planner aiming at maximizing the utility of all generations. As we are only
considering a single period, we omit the time index t.
4Hence the intermediate ﬁrms are either monopolistic or fully competitive. A compet-
itive intermediate ﬁrm sets prices equal to the marginal costs, pc(i) = w, and proﬁts









where w denotes the wage level.
The monopolistic intermediate ﬁrm asks a price pm(i) = w























3.3 Technological State, Innovation, and Foreign Entry
We assume that there is a world technological frontier which at the end of the observed
period is given by ¯ A and grows exogenously over time in accordance with
¯ A = γ ¯ A−1,
where ¯ A−1 denotes the technological frontier of the preceding period.5 Further, we
assume that 1 < γ ≤ 2.
At the end of the preceding period, each intermediate ﬁrm can be of three types:
Type 1 ﬁrms produce at the current technological frontier, A−1(i) = ¯ A−1.
Type 2 ﬁrms are one step behind the technological frontier, A−1(i) = ¯ A−2.
Type 3 ﬁrms are two steps behind the technological frontier, A−1(i) = ¯ A−3.
By investing in research and development, each intermediate ﬁrm can enhance its
probability of realizing a successful innovation. A successful innovation increases the
ﬁrm’s technology level by a factor γ, thus allowing it to retain its relative position
vis-` a-vis the technological frontier. We specify the probability of type 1 and type 2








5In general, the index −j (j ∈ N) indicates how many periods back the indexed term is.
5where θ > 0 is a parameter that captures the eﬃciency of research. LI(i) denotes
the intermediate ﬁrm’s labor employed for R&D and LB the amount of labor in the
basic-research sector ﬁnanced by the government. Throughout the paper, we will look
at economies where we have an interior solution for all ρ(i). Note that basic research
is a necessary input for innovation activities and constitutes a public good from which
domestic intermediate ﬁrms that are technological leaders in their respective sector can
beneﬁt. Domestic intermediate ﬁrms lagging technologically have no incentive to invest
in innovation, as such an investment would not enable them to get ahead of their rivals
and earn proﬁts. Like Aghion et al. (2006), we neglect the adoption costs of mature
technologies, i.e. technologies two steps behind the world’s frontier, and consequently
assume that a type 3 ﬁrm’s technology is automatically upgraded.
From a long term perspective, each intermediate sector is in one of three states at the
beginning of the period considered:
State 1 Type 1 leader holding a monopoly
State 2 Type 2 leader holding a monopoly
State 3 Two (or more) type 3 ﬁrms acting competitively
We denote the fractions of the states by s1 (state 1), s2 (state 2), and s3 (state 3),
where s1,s2,s3 ≥ 0 and s1 + s2 + s3 = 1.
In each sector i not producing at the world’s technological frontier, either because the
domestic intermediate ﬁrm has failed to innovate or has been lagging behind previously,
the probability of a foreign competitor entering the domestic market is σ. We assume
that the foreign intermediate ﬁrm enters with frontier technology ¯ A and consequently
takes over the whole market.6 There are many empirical studies indicating for industri-
alized countries that foreign direct investment by leading-edge companies can transfer
the best production techniques to the host countries (e.g. Baily and Gersbach 1995,
Keller and Yeaple 2003 or Alfaro et al. 2006). In sectors where the domestic intermedi-
ate ﬁrm produces at the highest possible level, foreign competitors will stay outside7,
so this can only be the case in sectors where a type 1 leader innovates successfully.
6This implies that there is a fourth state for the intermediate sectors, i.e. with a foreign type 1
leader holding a monopoly. For simplicity, we assume that at the beginning of the period considered
no intermediate sector is in this state. Allowing for foreign ﬁrms from the outset would only lead to
a downscaling of the eﬀects and thus does not alter the results substantially.
7This statement can be justiﬁed by small entry costs preventing the foreign ﬁrm from entering the
market under perfect competition (see Aghion et al. 2006).
63.4 R&D Decisions of Intermediate Firms
Given the state of their sector, the entry threat of foreign ﬁrms, and the level of basic
research, the domestic intermediate ﬁrms maximize their expected proﬁts with respect
to the amount of labor employed in private R&D:























The state 1 leader will retain the market and make proﬁts if it innovates success-
fully or if it does not innovate and there is no entry. The maximization problem
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¯ A−1 − wL
I(i)
¾
The state 2 leader will only make proﬁts if it innovates successfully and there is
no foreign entry. If it does not innovate, the type 3 rival will automatically catch
up. The sector is then subject to perfect competition and the proﬁts vanish. The

































• All the remaining domestic ﬁrms will not invest in R&D as they have no prospects
of making proﬁts.
73.5 Equilibrium
The economy comprises the market for the ﬁnal consumption good with price unity,
the labor market with wage rate w, and a continuum of intermediate-good markets
with prices {p(i)}1
i=0. It follows from section 3.2 that the market clearing conditions in
the intermediate-good markets yield prices pm(i) = w
α in the monopolistic sectors and
pc(i) = w in the competitive ones. From (3), (4), and (5) we obtain the values for the
















in the monopolistic intermediate sectors and the competitive intermediate sectors, re-
spectively.
In the labor market, labor ¯ L is supplied inelastically. Labor demand consists of the
government’s demand for basic researchers, the intermediate ﬁrm’s demand for private
R&D personnel, and the demand of workers for the production of the intermediate
goods. Hence the labor market clears when










As we know from section 3.3, the demand for R&D personnel depends on the state of







Note that the total demand for private researchers is determined by the number of sec-
tors characterized by domestic monopolies at the beginning of the period. By contrast,
the demand for workers in intermediate-goods production depends on the sector’s tech-
nological level after innovation activities and foreign entry have occurred. This reﬂects
our assumption that foreign intermediate ﬁrms bring leading technology with them
from abroad but produce the intermediate goods within the country. Accordingly, in
order to determine the second integral in (16) we need to know how sector states evolve
during the period. The following scheme displays the probabilities for levels of tech-
nology achieved by an intermediate sector. The illustration also shows the resulting
8market structure in terms of the mode of competition and of whether intermediate





ρI1 : ¯ A, local, monopoly
(1 − ρI1)σ : ¯ A, foreign, monopoly





σ : ¯ A, foreign, monopoly
(1 − σ)ρI2 : ¯ A−1, local, monopoly
(1 − ρI2)(1 − σ) : ¯ A−2, local, perfect competition
s3 −→
½
σ : ¯ A, foreign, monopoly
(1 − σ) : ¯ A−2, local, perfect competition
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Inserting (17) and (18) into (16) we obtain the equilibrium wage level. In general, the
equilibrium wage is not unique. By assuming α = 1
2 and ¯ L = 1, we can solve the
market clearing condition for basic-research labor as a function of wage w:
L
B(w) = w
2 w2 − A
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2[s1(γ − 1 + σ)
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2(1 − σ)[s1γ(γ − 1)(γ − 1 + σ) + s2(γ − 4)(1 − σ)]. (22)
As the number of researchers can never be negative, the equilibrium wage must be
higher than
√
A. Further, we slightly restrict our parameter space in accordance with
the following assumption:
Assumption 1
B + C > −A2.
We are now in a position to state
9Lemma 1
Under Assumption 1 there exists a unique solution to the government’s problem.
Proof : See Appendix A.1.
From the equilibrium wage we obtain the equilibrium prices for intermediate goods from
which the equilibrium quantities and the ﬁrms’ proﬁts follow. To simplify notation, we
will henceforth use w to denote the equilibrium wage associated with a particular level
of basic research.
3.6 Government
The government chooses the amount of basic-research labor LB required to maximize
aggregate consumption c of the current generation. The expenditures wLB are ﬁnanced
by a tax τ ∈ [0,1] on household income. Households earn wages and obtain proﬁts from
ﬁnal-good and domestic intermediate-goods production. Consequently, the budget
constraint for the government is
wL




where πy denotes the proﬁts of the ﬁnal-good sector.8 Aggregate consumption c equals
total income after taxes:
c = (1 − τ)
¡





With uniqueness of the equilibrium wage w for given LB, the government’s problem
can also be solved via the control w. We will take this path as it permits an explicit
solution for LB as a function of w. Economically, this approach could be interpreted
as a wage oﬀer by the government for doing basic research in order to attract the
corresponding (equilibrium) number of researchers.
Inserting LB(w) from equation (19) and budget constraint (23) into (24), we obtain
overall consumption solely as a function of the equilibrium wage level w:
c(w) =
w4(2A + 2D + E) + w2(2B + 3C + F) + (B + C)(2D + E) − A(C + F)
w(w4 + B + C)
, (25)














2 > 0. (28)
This is the objective function the government maximizes with respect to the wage w.
Lemma 2
Under Assumption 1 there exists a unique maximum consumption level.
Proof : See Appendix A.2.
However, it is impossible to derive an analytical solution to the problem in its entire
generality. Accordingly, we will ﬁrst focus our analysis on two particular settings and
then discuss the eﬀects of basic research more generally on the basis of numerical
simulations.
4 Eﬀects of Basic Research
Before turning to comparative statics, we now introduce the diﬀerent direct and indirect
eﬀects of basic-research investment on aggregate consumption.
4.1 Direct Eﬀects
Recall that aggregate consumption is deﬁned by (24) and consists of total income after
taxes, which includes labor income and the proﬁts of the type 1 ﬁrms, the type 2 ﬁrms,
and the ﬁnal-good sector. If the government decides to increase basic research LB, the
direct eﬀects on consumption are the following:
Escape Entry Eﬀect: State 1 leaders (type 1 ﬁrms) will avoid foreign entry and
retain the domestic market if they innovate successfully to keep up with the
technological frontier. As basic research facilitates innovation, it helps state 1
leaders to retain domestic proﬁts, which increases the consumption of households
as shareholders.
11Monopoly Eﬀect: State 2 leaders (type 2 ﬁrms) can only preserve their technological
advantage and retain their monopoly position if they innovate successfully (and
no foreign entry takes place). Otherwise they will lose their competitive edge as
type 3 ﬁrms will catch up technologically. In this way, basic research helps state 2
leaders to make proﬁts, which has a positive eﬀect on consumption. However, the
monopoly of the state 2 leaders lowers the proﬁts of the competitive ﬁnal-good
sector caused by higher intermediate-goods prices. The second eﬀect dominates
as a result of the well-known monopoly distortion factor. The net eﬀect is what
we call the monopoly eﬀect.
Productivity Eﬀect: Basic research increases the probability of successful innovation
and thus enhances technology growth. Higher technology raises proﬁts for both
the intermediate ﬁrms and the ﬁnal-good sector. Consequently this eﬀect on
consumption is positive.
Wage Income Eﬀect: Higher labor employment in the basic-research sector reduces
the labor supply for the intermediate ﬁrms. Consequently the equilibrium wage
increases, which leads to higher consumption.
Direct Tax Eﬀect: Enlarging the public sector implies a higher tax rate τ. This
lowers consumption.
4.2 Indirect Eﬀects
Indirect eﬀects of basic research on consumption arise from changes in the equilibrium
wage rate. The higher wage caused by an increase of basic research inﬂuences the
proﬁts and the tax rate in the following way:
Labor Price Eﬀect: The higher price for labor increases the production and innova-
tion costs of the intermediate ﬁrms and thus lowers their proﬁts. This eﬀect on
consumption is negative.
Intermediate Price Eﬀect: As the production costs of the intermediate ﬁrms in-
crease with the wage rate, the price of the intermediate goods will also rise. This
leads to lower proﬁts in the ﬁnal-good sector with negative eﬀects on consump-
tion.
12Indirect Tax Eﬀect: A higher wage means that the costs for one unit of labor in
public basic research are higher. Therefore the tax has to be increased, which
lowers consumption.
4.3 Magnitude of Eﬀects
In general, the magnitude of the eﬀects of basic research on domestic consumption
depends on the values of the exogenous parameters. However, it is instructive to recall
that the impact of basic research depends on the extent to which it is used, i.e. how
much private research is done by the domestic intermediate ﬁrms. The total amount of
private R&D depends on how many intermediate ﬁrms are investing in private research
and the intensity with which they do so. The former is exogenous, whereas the latter
is endogenously determined within the model.
The exogenously given use of basic research depends on the country’s industry struc-
ture, i.e. shares s1, s2, s3. Suppose that in each kind of intermediate sector the ﬁrms
display certain research intensities. Then the beneﬁts of basic research will increase in
the shares of sectors with high research intensities.
However, the extent to which intermediate ﬁrms invest in private R&D is endogenously
determined in the model. A type 1 ﬁrm will still retain a monopoly position without
innovation, whereas a type 2 ﬁrm would lose all its proﬁts if it fails to innovate. Hence,
innovation incentives in a closed economy are higher for a type 2 ﬁrm than for a type 1
ﬁrm. This changes with higher degrees of openness, as for a type 1 ﬁrm the probability
of retaining a monopoly position without innovating decreases as does the probability
of retaining the monopoly with innovation for type 2 ﬁrms. Hence, the innovation
incentive for type 1 ﬁrms increases with the degree of openness, whereas that of the
type 2 ﬁrms decreases. These eﬀects are similar to the escape entry eﬀects identiﬁed
in Aghion et al. (2006).
5 Comparative Statics
5.1 Corner Scenarios
First, we take a look at the corner scenarios. This will enable us to derive analytical
results. We start by analyzing how the government should behave in an economy that
13only has technologically advanced intermediate ﬁrms (s1 = 1), followed by the analysis
of an economy that only has technologically backward intermediate ﬁrms (s2 = 1).
The scenario s3 = 1 is of no interest, as we already know that in this state ﬁrms will
not invest in R&D and consequently the government has no incentive to invest in basic
research at all.
5.1.1 Technologically Advanced Country: s1 = 1
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σ > 0 (33)
F = 0. (34)
We thus obtain
Lemma 3
(i) LB(w), deﬁned by (19), starts at zero for w = 0. It then declines and becomes
zero again at the wage level denoted by wzero =
√
A. In the range w > wzero it
is positive and strictly increasing. It ﬁnally converges to ¯ L = 1 for w → ∞.
(ii) For w ≥ wzero, c(w) is either always decreasing and converging to zero or it
increases ﬁrst, reaches a unique maximum, and then monotonically declines and
converges to zero for w → ∞.
Proof : (i) follows directly from equations (19) and (29)-(31). For the proof of (ii) see
Appendix A.3.
It is clear from Lemma 3 (i) that for an eligible equilibrium w ≥ wzero must hold. This
accords with economic intuition, as wzero is the equilibrium wage level resulting when
the government does not intervene in the economy, i.e. when it does not invest in basic
14research. Only if the government oﬀers a higher wage than wzero can it attract labor
for basic research.
Lemma 3 also illustrates that, in principle, the government can achieve any value
LB < ¯ L = 1 by oﬀering a wage rate that is high enough. Of course, a level of
basic research arbitrarily close to ¯ L cannot be optimal. This follows directly from
the decreasing marginal product of basic research and the production function of ﬁnal
goods satisfying the Inada conditions. Intuitively, as the high governmental wage will
draw labor from production, the marginal increase in technology will not compensate
for the marginal loss in the production of intermediates, and consequently ﬁnal output
will decline.
Proposition 1
(i) The government’s maximization problem has a unique solution w∗. w∗ > wzero
implies a positive level of optimal basic research, LB > 0.
(ii) For all parameter values there exists a θcrit such that for θcrit ≤ θ < θmax a
positive amount of optimal basic research LB results. θmax denotes the value of
the research productivity coeﬃcient that leads to ρI1 = 1.
Proof : (i) follows directly from Lemma 3; (ii) see Appendix A.4.
In general, two characteristics of a country whose intermediate sectors are all of the
state 1 variety favor basic research investments. First, as state 1 leaders will still retain a
monopoly position even if they do not innovate (as long as there is no foreign entry), the
negative implications of the monopoly eﬀect on total consumption are absent. Second,
the magnitude of the escape entry eﬀect will reach its maximum, as basic research only
enables s1 ﬁrms to escape foreign competition. However, it is still possible that the
negative eﬀects described in section 4 will dominate, so that it would be favorable for
the government to abstain from basic-research investments. From Proposition 1, this
may occur when research productivity as reﬂected by θ is suﬃciently low.
155.1.2 Technologically Backward Country: s2 = 1
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2 > 0. (40)
Lemma 4
(i) LB(w), deﬁned by (19), always increases in w.
(ii) c(w), deﬁned by (25), always falls in w in the relevant space w > wzero.
Proof : (i) see proof of Lemma 1; (ii) see Appendix (A.5).
The curvature of the functions LB(w) and c(w) indicate that for all LB the negative
eﬀects of basic research on consumption will dominate.
Proposition 2
The government does not invest in basic research.
Proof : Follows directly from Lemma 4.
In contrast to the scenario where s1 = 1, the positive escape entry eﬀect does not
exist when s2 = 1. The domestic intermediate ﬁrms cannot avoid the entry of the
foreign ﬁrms by innovating successfully, as they are too far away from the technological
frontier. Further, the monopoly eﬀect is maximal because the government could remove
all monopoly distortions by forgoing basic research. Hence, the government’s incentives
to invest in basic research tend to be low. Thus we can state:
Proposition 3
LB(w∗) |s1=1≥ LB(w∗) |s2=1
Proof : Follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2.
16According to Proposition 3, technologically advanced countries should always spend at
least as much on basic research as technologically backward countries. More precisely,
when comparing an economy characterized by s1 = 1 with another characterized by
s2 = 1, only the advanced country is likely to conduct basic research. This result follows
the intuition given with respect to Propositions 1 and 2. That is, in an economy where
s1 = 1, the negative monopoly eﬀect of basic research on consumption has no eﬀect.
On the other hand, in the s2 = 1 scenario the positive escape entry eﬀect is irrelevant.
Hence, basic research aﬀects consumption more positively in the s1 = 1 scenario than
in the s2 = 1 scenario.
5.2 Numerical Simulations
In this section we leave the corner scenarios to look at the comparative statics of more
general settings that cannot be solved analytically.9 Therefore we will use numerical
simulations as the basis for the following discussion. The basic parametrization of the
model will be: ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5, σ = 0.7, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0.
We will then derive our comparative statics results by varying one parameter while
holding the others ﬁxed. This enables us to isolate the eﬀects of diﬀerent parameters
on optimal basic-research expenditures. Our simulations indicate that these are valid
for large parameter sets and are not speciﬁc to our parametrization. We will also
address special cases.
5.2.1 Distance from Technological Frontier
We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of a country’s distance from the world’s technological frontier
on the optimal amount of basic research. The technological level of the economy varies
across sectors and is thus characterized by the country’s industry structure as reﬂected
by the parameters s1, s2, and s3. Since the shares of the diﬀerent sector-types must
add up to 1 the most, we will always vary the share of one sector type at the expense of
the share of exactly one other sector type. In particular, we will discuss the following
three cases: s1 vs. s2, s1 vs. s3, and s2 vs. s3.
9The optimal wage w∗ is given by the derivative of equation (25), which is a polynomial of degree
eight.







Figure 1: Eﬀect of Distance from Frontier: s1 vs. s2 ( ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5,
σ = 0.7, s2 = 1 − s1, s3 = 0)
s1 vs. s2
This case generalizes the corner scenarios in the preceding section. Accordingly, we
would expect the escape entry eﬀect to monotonically increase in s1, starting out from
zero at s1 = 0 and reaching its maximum at s1 = 1. By contrast, the monopoly eﬀect
should decrease from its maximum value at s1 = 0 to zero at s1 = 1. Hence, opti-
mal basic-research investment would increase in the share of technologically advanced
sectors. As can be seen in Figure 1, the results are consistent with the intuition.
Robustness checks show that this result holds for a wide range of parameters. However,
when openness σ is low, we may have the case where the optimal amount of basic
research ﬁrst increases in s1 and then falls later on. When σ is low, the escape entry
eﬀect is smaller, and the remaining eﬀects have relatively more weight. The costs of
basic research increase in s1 as type 1 ﬁrms have a higher demand for workers than
type 2 ﬁrms due to their higher technological level and this leads to a wage increase.
Where the escape entry eﬀect is small due to a low degree of openness, the negative
eﬀect described becomes dominant for a high share of state 1 sectors. This induces the
government to lower basic research when s1 increases.







Figure 2: Eﬀect of Distance from Frontier: s1 vs. s3 ( ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5,
σ = 0.7, s2 = 0, s3 = 1 − s1)
s1 vs. s3
The way in which the optimal amount of basic research is aﬀected by a rise of s1
coupled with a decline of s3 is shown in Figure 2. Optimal basic-research investments
increase in proportion with the share of state-1 sectors. The intuition is clear. The
government has no incentive to invest in basic research to support the intermediate
ﬁrms in state 3, because they will never invest in R&D. However, as we already know,
there are positive incentives to provide basic research for state 1 leaders.
Nonetheless, robustness checks have shown that, as in the s1 vs. s2 analysis, when σ
is low, optimal basic research may ﬁrst increase with s1, reach a maximum, and then
fall. Again, the escape entry eﬀect is small, and the costs of basic research, i.e. the
wage rate increase in s1, will assume a dominant role at some point. The reason is that
the state 1 leaders’ demand for labor in production and innovation for a given LB is
higher than the labor employment of intermediate ﬁrms in state 3. Hence, the larger
the share s1 is, the higher the wage and consequently the costs of basic research will
be.
s2 vs. s3
Figure 3 shows that an increase of s2 at the expense of s3 has a positive eﬀect on
the optimal amount of labor for basic research. Simulations across all parametrical






Figure 3: Eﬀect of Distance from Frontier: s2 vs. s3 ( ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5,
σ = 0.7, s1 = 0.8, s3 = 0.2 − s2)
values conﬁrm this result. Intermediate ﬁrms in state 3 are automatically upgraded in
technological terms and thus do not need support from basic research. This explains
the pattern in ﬁgure 3.
Summary
According to the analysis of these three distinct cases, the broad picture is that the
closer a country is to the technological frontier, the more the government should invest
in basic research. There are exceptions however, in particular when openness is small
and research productivity is very high.
5.2.2 Openness
We next consider how variations in the degree of openness aﬀects optimal basic research.
The inﬂuence of openness on optimal basic research is ambiguous, as shown by the
comparison of Figures 4 and 5. If we choose a lower innovation size γ as in Figure
4, we have a positive relationship between optimal basic research and openness. An
increase of innovation size will cause the eﬀect to go in the opposite direction, as
illustrated by Figure 5. What explanation is there for this result?
The direction of the openness eﬀect depends on the weight of the productivity eﬀect
relative to the escape entry eﬀect. The latter is larger the more open a country is,
because the threat of losing domestic proﬁts increases. By contrast, the productivity







Figure 4: Eﬀect of Openness ( ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0)








Figure 5: Eﬀect of Openness (¯ A = 100, γ = 1.5, θ = 2.5, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0)
eﬀect decreases with openness, as foreign intermediate ﬁrms transfer leading technology
to the domestic country. Consequently, the government has less incentive to invest in
basic research and hence in technological progress itself. As the innovation size γ scales
the productivity eﬀect, the escape entry eﬀect dominates when γ is low, so that optimal
basic-research expenditures increase with the country’s degree of openness. Vice versa,
a large innovation size implies that the productivity eﬀect plays the more important
role and optimal basic-research investments will decline with openness. Note that the
escape entry eﬀect is still present, but due to the higher magnitude of the productivity
eﬀect, optimal basic-research investments are in general higher with larger values of γ.
With σ = 1 when the productivity eﬀect reaches its minimum, optimal basic-research







Figure 6: Eﬀect of Innovation Size ( ¯ A = 100, θ = 2.5, σ = 0.7, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2,
s3 = 0)
expenditures are, in principle, independent of the innovation size.
Robustness checks support this result for all parameter values. However, we note that
the presence of a certain number of state 1 sectors is needed to obtain a positive
relationship between openness and basic research. The reason is that the magnitude of
the escape entry eﬀect depends positively on the share of state 1 sectors. This is clear,
as only type 1 ﬁrms can compete with foreign intermediate ﬁrms. Additionally, with
an increasing degree of openness, private research intensity also increases in state-1
sectors.10
5.2.3 Innovation Size
In this section we examine how the size of innovation γ inﬂuences optimal basic re-
search. As expected and depicted in Figure 6, the higher the innovation size is, the
more labor a government should employ for basic research. This is obvious, as basic
research fosters innovation and so a higher innovation size will improve the eﬃciency
of basic research. In other words, a larger innovation size implies a larger productivity
eﬀect. Our result is conﬁrmed by simulations across all parametrical values.









Figure 7: Eﬀect of Research Productivity ( ¯ A = 100, γ = 1.3, σ = 0.7, s1 = 0.8,
s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0)
5.2.4 Research Productivity
We can alter the productivity of both company research and basic research by modify-
ing θ. The higher θ is, the more probable a successful innovation becomes, so research
productivity is higher. It is straightforward to show that the optimal amount of basic
research increases with research productivity, as can be seen in Figure 7. Higher re-
search productivity mainly increases the escape entry eﬀect and the productivity eﬀect.
6 Discussion of the Results
6.1 Empirical Patterns
The two main implications of the preceding comparative statics analysis are the follow-
ing: First, the higher the share of technologically advanced sectors in a country is, the
more the government should invest in basic research. Second, the relationship between
openness and the optimal amount of basic research is ambiguous. If innovation sizes
are low, open countries should invest more in basic research in order to compete with
foreign intermediate ﬁrms. By contrast, if innovation sizes are large and the produc-
tivity eﬀect dominates accordingly a country’s policy might be to undertake less basic
research the more open it is.
10This eﬀect is similar to the escape entry eﬀect identiﬁed in Aghion et al. (2006).
23Figure 8: Relationship between Basic Research and Productivity
How do our results square with empirical patterns of basic research? In Figure 8 the
relationship between basic research and productivity is shown based on country data.
We observe that the technological level and basic-research expenditures are positively
associated.11 There is further empirical evidence supporting the positive relationship
between economic development and basic research (e.g. Cole and Phelan (1999) and
Schofer (2004)).
Figure 9 presents the data on openness and basic research. To quantify openness we
construct an exposure index that measures to which degree domestic industries are
exposed to foreign competition. The exposure index consists of the variables trade
(percent of GDP), FDI ﬂows (percent of GDP), FDI stocks (percent of GDP), hidden
import barriers, mean tariﬀ rate and taxes on international trade (percent of current
revenue).12 In ﬁgure 9 we consider only advanced countries, as the numerical simula-
tions of section 5.2 indicate that positive basic-research investments require a certain
proportion of technologically advanced sectors. The data indicate no clear correlation
11A more detailed empirical study that goes beyond a simple correlation would be desirable, but
this is impeded by data availability.
12A broader economic globalization index is given in Dreher (2006) that takes into account interna-
tional economic linkages beyond foreign competition. We refer to this work for a detailed description
of the data sources and on how the variables are normalized. Dreher uses a principal components
analysis to determine the weights of the variables. As equal weights produce approximately the same
results, we choose the simple weighting scheme.
24Figure 9: Relationship between Basic Research and Openness
between a country’s degree of openness and its basic-research expenditures.13 Taking
the total factor productivity as a proxy for the total share of advanced sectors in the
economy, the two ﬁgures 8 and 9 can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways, as we exemplify
for France and Ireland.
Consider the two countries France (FRA) and Ireland (IRL), which have about the
same productivity but diﬀerent levels of basic-research expenditures. Hence, we could
explain the France/Ireland case as a negative relationship between basic research and
openness. With Ireland being more open, it would invest less in basic research than
France.
The France/Ireland case might also be consistent with a positive association between
basic research and openness when we take into account the role of foreign direct in-
vestment. Ireland’s policy over the last decades has been characterized by abandoning
trade barriers and attracting foreign direct investment, which has helped to increase its
total factor productivity considerably. Accordingly, the share of domestic high technol-
ogy ﬁrms is substantially lower than in France as many leading sectors are populated
by foreign ﬁrms.14 Ireland may invest less in basic research for this reason despite be-
13An equivalent ﬁgure for the less developed countries leads to the same conclusion. Again, these
results are only an initial impulse and should be considered with care.
14FDI data can be found in UNCTAD (2007) and World Bank (2007).




















Figure 10: Eﬀect of Openness on Consumption and Optimal Basic Research ( ¯ A = 100,
γ = 1.3, θ = 2.5, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0)
ing more open. Which of these explanations is more accurate is left to detailed future
empirical research.
6.2 Joint Policies: Openness and Basic Research
Are we able to say anything about optimal policies with respect to both basic research
and openness from our previous examinations? Extending Figure 4 by including the
graph of domestic consumption yields Figure 10. It shows a decrease of consumption
with openness. Hence, the government’s optimal policy is to set σ = 0 and not to
invest in basic research in such a setting. On the one hand, low innovation size makes
basic research less beneﬁcial, and on the other, foreign ﬁrms do not greatly advance
the technological level but take the proﬁts away from some domestic ﬁrms.
As illustrated by Figure 11, if the innovation size is high, the government should open
the borders to allow foreign ﬁrms to enter the market and bring in high technology.
However, it should still invest in basic research, as is clear if we bear in mind that
optimal basic-research expenditures with a high innovation size are always above those
with a low innovation size.
As a hypothesis we can state that if the productivity eﬀect dominates over the escape
entry eﬀect, the government should choose a high degree of openness and simultane-




















Figure 11: Eﬀect of Openness on Consumption and Optimal Basic Research ( ¯ A = 100,
γ = 1.9, θ = 2.5, s1 = 0.8, s2 = 0.2, s3 = 0)
ously a relatively low level of basic-research investments. In the opposite case, if the
escape entry eﬀect plays the central role, borders should be closed and basic-research
expenditures should be very low or even zero.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have augmented the Schumpeterian growth model of Aghion et al.
(2006) with a public basic-research sector which allows to determine how much a coun-
try should invest in basic research depending on its technological level and its openness
to the world market.
Our model opens up a variety of avenues for future research. For instance, it might
be useful to endogenize the behavior of foreign countries and to examine the problem
of choosing basic research from a global perspective. It may also be interesting, and
by no means trivial, to establish the dynamics of our model and to examine a social
planner’s solution for basic-research investment across many generations.
27A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We show that the function LB(w) strictly increases in w, hence the inverse function
exists. As LB < 0 is not feasible, wages lower than
√
A are not possible in equilibrium.








reveals that LB will be zero for w = wzero =
√
A and converges to 1 for w → ∞. No
equilibrium exists for w <
√
A. For w ≥ wzero, it is convenient to replace w by
√
xA,

























¢2 > 0. (43)





xA2 > 0. (44)
If B + C > 0, we can estimate the left-hand side from below by multiplying the last
term with 1




which is obviously satisﬁed.
We now consider the case where B + C < 0. As the left hand side of (44) is increasing
in x, we know that if condition (44) is satisﬁed for x = 1, it will also be satisﬁed for
x > 1. Inserting x = 1, we obtain
1 +
B + C
A2 > 0. (45)
This holds under Assumption 1, i.e. if B + C > −A2.
28A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove that we have a unique maximum consumption level in the relevant space
w ≥ wzero, we show that c(w) is either always decreasing in w or increasing in w,
reaching a local maximum, and then decreasing in w.




−w8(2A + 2D + E) − 3w6(2B + 3C + F) + w4(B + C)(6A − 4D − 2E)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
5w4A(C + F) + w2(B + C)(2B + 3C + F)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
(B + C)
¡
A(C + F) − (B + C)(2D + E)
¢
w2(w4 + B + C)2
It is obvious that the denominator is positive. Hence, to determine the slope it is
suﬃcient to focus on the numerator only. As we are interested in the relevant space
w ≥ wzero =
√
A, it is convenient to replace w by
√
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We note that A,B,D,E,F > 0, F > −C, and A > D + E. The analysis can be
simpliﬁed by distinguishing four cases.
1. B + C > 0 and (B + C)(2D + E) − A(C + F) < 0
U and V , the terms with the highest exponents of x, are negative, while all the
remaining terms, W, X, Y , and Z, are positive. Hence, it is obvious that in
this case c(w) either falls straightaway in x or w, or it rises ﬁrst and falls after
reaching its maximum.
2. B + C > 0 and (B + C)(2D + E) − A(C + F) > 0
U and V are negative, W, X, and Y are positive, and Z is again negative. If Y
dominates Z for x = 1, it is always dominating and as in the preceding case the
29exponents of x can be used to state the uniqueness of a maximum consumption
level. Inserting x = 1 in Y + Z > 0 leads to
A(B + C)(2B + 4C + 2F) − (B + C)
2(2D + E) > 0
A(2B + 4C + 2F) > (B + C)(2D + E)
2A(C + F) + 2A(B + C) > (2D + E)(B + C).
As A > D + E, the inequality holds, and the existence of a unique maximum is
shown.
3. B + C < 0 and 2B + 3C + F > 0
U and V are still negative, W is positive, and the remaining terms, X, Y , and
Z, are negative. Thus it is suﬃcient to show that W + X + Y + Z > 0 holds for
x = 1. Arguing with the exponents of x again, c(w) is then either falling all along
or rising before falling continuously. Next we prove that W +X +Y +Z > 0 for
x = 1:
5A
3(C + F) + A
2(B + C)(6A − 4D − 2E) + A(B + C)(2B + 3C + F)+
A(B + C)(C + F) − (B + C)
2(2D + E) > 0
Estimating W + X + Y + Z from below by using Assumption 1, the inequality
reduces to
4A
3(C + F) + A
2(B + C)(6A − 4D − 2E) + A(B + C)(2B + 3C + F)+
−(B + C)
2(2D + E) > 0
4A
3(C + F) + A
2(B + C)(6A − 2D − E) + A(B + C)(2B + 3C + F) > 0
3A
3(C + F) + A
2(B + C)(6A − 2D − E) + 2A(B + C)
2 > 0
3A
3(C + F) + 2A(B + C)
2 − A
2(B + C)(2D + E) + 6A
3(B + C) > 0.
The second and third terms are positive. Hence, again estimating the LHS from
below by neglecting them gives us
3A
3(C + F) + 6A
3(B + C) > 0
3(C + F) + 6(B + C) > 0
2B + 3C + F > 0
This inequality holds by the deﬁnition of the case we are dealing with.
304. B + C < 0 and 2B + 3C + F < 0
In this case, U is negative, V and W are positive, X is negative, Y is positive, and
ﬁnally Z is negative. It is thus slightly more complicated to show the existence
of a unique maximum of c(w). We have to take two steps. First we show that X
dominates Y at x = 1.
A
2(B + C)(6A − 4D − 2E) + A(B + C)(2B + 3C + F) < 0
A(6A − 4D − 2E) + 2B + 3C + F > 0
The fact that A > D + E allows us to reduce the inequality to
2A
2 + 2B + 3C + F > 0.
Furthermore, omitting the positive term C + F leads to
2A
2 + 2(B + C) > 0
A
2 > −(B + C).
According to Assumption 1 the inequality holds. Consequently, X + Y + Z is
negative along the whole relevant interval because of x ≥ 1 and X having the
larger exponent of x. The next step is to prove that V +W +Y +X +Z > 0 for
x = 1.
−3A
3(2B + 3C + F) + 5A
3(C + F) + A
2(B + C)(6A − 4D − 2E)+
A(B + C)(2B + 3C + F) + (B + C)
¡




3(C + F) + 2A(B + C)(B + 2C + F)+
−2A
2(B + C)(2D + E) − (B + C)
2(2D + E) > 0
Making use of Assumption 1, we can reduce the inequity in the following way:
2A
3(C + F) + 2A(B + C)(B + 2C + F) − A
2(B + C)(2D + E) > 0
2A(B + C)
2 − A
2(B + C)(2D + E) > 0
As both terms are positive, the inequity is correct. Considering the exponents of x
and the two facts that X+Y +Z < 0 always holds and that V +W+X+Y +Z > 0
at x = 1, we can state the validity of V + W + X + Y + Z > 0 along the whole
relevant interval. Furthermore, we know that U is negative and has the highest
exponent of x. Thus in this case too, c(w) either falls continuously or rises ﬁrst
to reach a maximum and falls subsequently.
31A.3 Proof of Lemma 3 (ii)
First we note that A = D +E and recall that F = 0. Thus, equation (25) simpliﬁes to
c(w) |s1=1=
w4(3A + D) + w2(2B + 3C) + (B + C)D + AB
w(w4 + B + C)
.
We know from equations (29)-(33) that A, B, C, D, E > 0. Hence, it is obvious that
c(w) is positive if w > 0. It starts at +∞ for w = 0 and is converging to zero as w









−w8(3A + D) − 3w6(2B + 3C) − 2w4D(B + C)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
w4A(4B + 9C) + w2(2B + 3C)(B + C)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
−(B + C)
¡
AB + D(B + C)
¢
w2(w4 + B + C)2 .
(46)
As the denominator is positive for w > 0, the numerator determines the sign of
∂c(w)
∂w .
It is clear that the numerator is negative for w close to zero and approaches −∞ for
w → ∞. As we are interested in the interval w ≥ wzero =
√
A, we insert w =
√
xA
where x ≥ 1. The numerator then takes the form
− x
4A
4(3A + D) − 3x
3A





3(4B + 9C) + xA(2B + 3C)(B + C) − (B + C)
¡
AB + D(B + C)
¢
.
The last term is negative, but it is straightforward to show that it is dominated by
the second to last term, i.e. xA(2B + 3C)(B + C) > (B + C)
¡
AB + D(B + C)
¢
. As
the remaining negative terms possess the highest exponents of x, a negative value of
the derivative of c(w) at wzero, i.e. at x = 1, implies that it will remain negative for
the entire range, w > wzero. On the other hand, if
∂c(w)
∂w at wzero is positive, it will
eventually change its sign once and stay negative. It follows that in the relevant set
w > wzero, c(w) either rises ﬁrst, then reaches a unique maximum, and declines later,
or c(w) is decreasing over the entire interval.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1 (ii)
We show the existence of a unique θcrit by the following line of argument: Investments
























must be a unique θcrit where the derivative is exactly zero.
We already know from the proof of Lemma 2 (ii) that it is suﬃcient to analyze the
numerator of (46) to determine the sign of
∂c(w)
∂w . For w = wzero it takes the form
−A
4(3A + D) − 2A
3B − 2A
2D(B + C) + (B + C)
¡
A(B + 3C) − D(B + C)
¢
.
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7(γ − 1 + σ) − 6σγ
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and θ2, the expression simpliﬁes to
−
1
θ2(σγ + 1 − σ)
4¡
3σγ + 4(1 − σ)
¢
− 2(σγ + 1 − σ)
3(γ − 1 + σ)
2+
− 2(σγ + 1 − σ)
2(1 − σ)(γ − 1 + σ)
¡




2(γ − 1 + σ)
2¡




7(γ − 1 + σ) − 6σγ
¢




It is easy to see that the derivative of c(w) is negative for small θ and strictly increases
in θ without bound. This implies that there is a unique θcrit with
∂c(w)
∂w |w=wzero= 0 and
∂c(w)
∂w |w=wzero> 0 for all θ > θcrit.
We now show that the interval θcrit < θ < θmax is not empty by ﬁrst verifying the
existence of a θmax such that ρ(θmax) = 1 and then establishing that θcrit < θmax.
The existence of a θmax such that ρ(θmax) = 1 follows from the fact that public and
private research expenditures are strictly increasing in θ, as is the innovation probability
ρ. ρ is bound in LB and LI, as the latter cannot exceed the total labor supply, but it
is not bound in θ. Consequently, there exists a unique θmax.
We now show that θmax > θcrit. From Lemma 3 and the above considerations, we know
that for θ ≤ θcrit, there is no basic research, LB = 0. Hence according to equation (9),
ρI1 |θ≤θcrit= 0. It follows that θmax must be larger than θcrit.
33A.5 Proof of Lemma 4 (ii)
First we note that, according to equations (36) and (37), C = 2B
γ−4
γ and consequently
2B + C = B
4γ−8
γ ≤ 0. Further, we know that C + F = 2B. Taking the derivative of




−w8(2A + E) − 6w6(2B + C) − 2w4E(B + C)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
2w4A(8B + 3C) + 2w2(2B + C)(B + C)
w2(w4 + B + C)2 +
(B + C)
¡
2AB − E(B + C)
¢
w2(w4 + B + C)2 .
(47)
As the denominator is positive, it again suﬃces to analyze the numerator in order to
determine the sign of
∂c(w)
∂w . We verify that the numerator is negative in the relevant
set w ≥ wzero by showing that it is negative for wzero and that it is decreasing in w for
all w ≥ wzero.






















(V ) is negative, while (W), (Y ), and (Z) are positive. (X) is ambiguous.
In order to show that the derivative is negative, we proceed in two steps. First, we
sum X and W to ξ and verify that ξ is positive in the relevant space by showing
ξ(wzero) > 0.15 This enables us to argue that the derivative of polynomial (48) changes
its sign once the most. As (48) will be negative for large values of w, we demonstrate
in a second step that (48) is already negative for w = wzero. This implies that it is
negative for all w > wzero.
1. Deﬁning ξ(w) := W(w) + X(w) and inserting the smallest wage of the relevant




2.5(2B + C) + 8A
2.5(8B + 3C) > 0
−8B − 12C > 0.
15ξ(wzero) > 0 is suﬃcient for ξ(w) > 0∀w > wzero, as ξ will be positive for values of w larger than
some threshold value due to the higher exponent of w in W.
34Hence ξ(w) > 0 for w ≥ wzero. We conclude that equation (48) is always negative
in the relevant set if it is already negative for the smallest value w = wzero.
2. By inserting wzero in equation (48) we obtain
−8A
3.5(2A + E) − 36A
2.5(2B + C) + 8A
2.5(8B + 3C) − 8A
1.5E(B + C)+
4A
0.5(2B + C)(B + C) < 0
⇔ −8A
3(2A + E) − 4A
2(2B + 3C) − 8AE(B + C) + 4(2B + C)(B + C) < 0.
Due to Assumption 1, A >
p
−(B + C), we can estimate the expression from
above by inserting
p




− (B + C)
¢1.5 + 4(B + C)(2B + 3C) + 8E
¡
− (B + C)
¢1.5+
4(2B + C)(B + C) < 0
16B + 16C − 8B − 12C − 8B − 4C = 0.
Consequently equation (48) is smaller than zero, which implies that the numer-
ator of equation (47) is declining in w in the relevant interval.
We will ﬁnish the proof by inserting the minimal wage w = wzero =
√
A into the
numerator of equation (47) and by showing that it is negative.
−2A
5 + 4A












We now verify that both M and N are negative, which means that the whole term is
negative. First we divide M by A and 2
−A
4 + 2A
2B + (3B + C)(B + C) < 0.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to A shows that it is decreasing in A:
−4A
3 + 4AB < 0
−A
2 + B < 0.
As A ≥
p
−(B + C), we can insert
p
−(B + C) for A, which results in
2B + C ≤ 0.
This veriﬁes that M is negative.




2 + (B + C)
¢
< 0.
The negativity is given as A ≥
p
−(B + C). Consequently, N is falling in A, and we
can set
p




2 − 2(B + C)
2 + (B + C)
2¢
= 0.
This proves that, for the special case s2 = 1, c(w) is decreasing in w in the relevant
interval w ≥ wzero.
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